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The Jefferson Method of ~pportionment 
M.L. Balinski and H.P. Young 
Abstract 
The Jefferson method of apportionment is char- 
acterized by three properties: consistency, house- 
monotonicity, and satisfying lower quota. The method 
of smallest devisors is characterized similarly by 
substituting uFper quota for lower quota. 
I .  T h e  CongressionaZ Apportionment ProbZem 
Let p = p ,...ps) be the populations of s states, pi > 0 
N 
for all if and h 2 - 0 be the number of seats in the House of 
Representatives. The problem is to find an apportionment for h, 
a = a,... a ) each a. > 0 and integer, C; ai = h, which is, as. 
N S 1 = 
required by the Constitution , "according to their [the states' I 
respective numbers," that is, which is in some sense proportional 
to the populations p of the respective states. 
N 
An apportionment soZution is a function which to any popu- 
lation vector and all h associates a unique apportionment for h, 
a = fi(pfh) with Ciai = h. 1f f is a solution and h a house size i - 
then N fh is the function restricted to the domain (p,h8 1 ,  where 
N 
h 0 5 - h' 5 - h. is a soZution up to h and is an extension of h. 
Different solutions to a problem must be admitted since 
"ties" may occur, such as when two states with identical popu- 
lations must share an odd number of seats. ~ccordingly, an 
apportionment method i s  d e f i n e d  t o  be  a  non-empty s e t  o f  s o l u -  
t i o n s .  A s p e c i f i c  s o l u t i o n  up t o  some h  may have s e v e r a l  d i f -  
f e r e n t  e x t e n s i o n s .  
2. The Jefferson Proposal of 1 7 9 2  
The f i r s t  appor t ionment  b i l l  ( b a s e d  upon t h e  c e n s u s  o f  1 7 9 0 ) ,  
h e a t e d l y  d i s c u s s e d  and amended, was p a s s e d  by Congress  on  23 
March 1792. George Washington v e t o e d  it on 5 A p r i l  1792 p r i -  
m a r i l y  because ,  " . . . t h e r e  i s  no one  p r o p o r t i o n  o r  d i v i s o r  which,  
a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  numbers o f  t h e  S t a t e s ,  w i l l  y i e l d  t h e  
number and a l l o t m e n t  of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  p roposed  by t h e  b i l l  
[ 8 ]  . " 
The p o p u l a t i o n  f i g u r e s  and f i r s t  b i l l ' s  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  are 
g i v e n  i n  Tab le  1 .  Washington sough t  o u t  t h e  o p i n i o n s  o f  Hamil ton ,  
J e f f e r s o n ,  Knox and Randolph, and fo l lowed  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  J e f f e r s o n ,  
w i t h  t h e  concordance  o f  Knox and Randolph, i n  c a s t i n g  t h i s  f i r s t  
P r e s i d e n t i a l  v e t o .  But  I lamil ton s u p p o r t e d  t h e  b i l l ,  f o r ,  as h e  
c o r r e c t l y  m a i n t a i n e d ,  it r e s u l t e d  from a p p l y i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ,  
seemingly  r e a s o n a b l e  method [ 5 ]  . Def ine  t h e  exact quota o f  
s t a t e  j t o  b e  q .  ( p , h )  = p .h /C .  p  Then, Hamilton's method is :  
I N  1 1 i' 
f i r s t ,  g i v e  t o  e a c h  s t a t e  i t h e  i n t e g e r  p a r t  o f  i t s  e x a c t  q u o t a  
l q i l ,  and o r d e r  t h e  s ta tes  by t h e i r  f r a c t i o n a l  r e m a i n d e r s  
= '1 
- [ q j J  i n  a  p r i o r i t y  l i s t  d  i...? d  - Second,  g i v e  
1, - - js 
one  a d d i t i o n a l  seat  t o  e a c h  o f  t h e  f i r s t  h  - Ci[qi] = C d .  s t a t e s  j I 
on t h e  l i s t .  
J e f f e r s o n  [ 6 ] ,  i n  d i s a g r e e i n g  w i t h  ~ a m i l t o n ,  s a i d ,  "I  answer ,  
t h e n ,  t h a t  t a x e s  must b e  d i v i d e d  exactly, and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
as nearly as the nearest ratio will admit; and the fractions 
must be neglected, because the Constitution calls absolutely that 
there be an apportionment or common ratio, and if any fractions 
result from the operation, it has left them unprovided for." 
Let L L  xll be the greatest integer less than x if x is non- 
integer, and otherwise be equal to x or x - 1. 
For a given h, Zi pi/h = A* represents the average size of 
a district, i.e. a "common ratio." ~efferson's proposal is: 
- 
choose a ratio X (<A*) such that Zi [[i. /A] J - =  h has a solution; 
- 1- 
then apportionments for h are found by taking ai = Ilpi/A1l 
satisfying Zi a = h. (The requirement that one take the 'near- i 
est" A having this property is superfluous.) 
An attempt to override Washington's veto failed and a new 
bill was approved on 14 April 1792 in which a "common ratio" 
of X = 33,000 was chosen and Jefferson's proposal used, thus 
giving h = 105. This solution is found in Table 1. In addition 
to arguing against Ilamilton, Jefferson further objected "[the 
bill] seems to have avoided establishing that [~amilton's method] 
into a rule, lest it might not suit on another occasion." Thus he 
clearly saw the need for a method. It happens;:bhtt~!J&f5e~~ari~:s 
approach gave to Virginia 19 seats whereas ~anilton's would have 
given it only 18. 
Jefferson's proposal was actually used as the apportionment 
rule applied to the first six censuses. However, the users seemed 
unaware of the fact that they could choose the size of the House 
h first, then obtain the proper A. Rather, they typically de- 
!bated hordes of different X's and took the h's these produced. 
Jefferson's approach may be viewed as a particular "rounding" 
procedure. Namely, choose a common divisor A, and for each 
state compute pi/A and round down to the nearest integer. In- 
stead, one might consider finding apportionments by rounding up .  
Specifically, let rrxl] be the smallest integer greater than x 
if x is not integer, and otherwise equal to x or'x + 1. Choose 
a A ( 2  - Eipi/h) such that Ci [ [pi/A1 1 = h can be obtained; then 
apportionments for h found by taking ai = [[pi/All satisfying 
C. a = h lead to the "method of smallest divisors." [3] 
1 i 
Of course, another natural rounding procedure is to round 
to the n e a r e s t  integer. Specifically, let [[XI] be x rounded 
to the nearest integer if x does not have a remainder of exactly 
1/2 and otherwise be equal to x - 1/2 or x + 1/2. Choose a A 
such that Ci[[pi/A]] = h can be obtained. Then apportionments 
. . - .  
. -. .. - -- 
for h found by taking ai = [[pi/A]] = h satisfying Ci ai = h lead 
to what we have called elsewhere "Webster's method" [3,91. For 
the populations of 1790 and h = 105 the Webster apportionment 
happen to be the same as Hamilton's. 
3 .  T h z  C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s  
A desirable property of any apportionment mzthod is that 
the number of seats accorded to any state not decrease  if the 
house size i n c r e a s e s .  We say that a method M is house monotone 
if for any 3-solution f and all p, h, 
N 
Except  f o r  t h e  c a s e  o f  t i e s ,  J e f f e r s o n ' s  "method" i s  e a s i l y  
s e e n  t o  b e  house  monotone, s i n c e  a s  h  i n c r e a s e s  h d e c r e a s e s ,  
whence t h e  numbers l l p i / h ] ]  do  n o t  d e c r e a s e .  If t i e s  o c c u r ,  
t h e y  can c l e a r l y  a lways  b e  r e s o l v e d  s o  t h a t  no  s t a t e  l o s e s  a  s e a t  
i n  a  l a r g e r  house.  Formal ly ,  w e  t h e r e f o r e  d e f i n e  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  
method J, t o  b e  t h e  set  of  a l l  house  monotone s o l u t i o n s  t h a t  
y i e l d  J e f f e r s o n  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s .  An e a s i l y  computable  c h a r a c t e r -  
i z a t i o n  o f  a l l  s u c h  s o l u t i o n s  i s  g i v e n  below i n  Lemma l ( b ) .  By 
c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  Hamil ton method d o e s  n o t  y i e l d  a  house  monotone 
method, a s  many examples a t t e s t  [ 3 ] .  T h i s  f a c t  was uncovered  
i n  t h e  1 8 8 0 ' s  when t h e  n o t o r i o u s  "Alabama paradox"  o c c u r r e d .  
A second b a s i c  p r o p e r t y  o f  methods r e v o l v e s  around t h e  
q u e s t i o n :  which s t a t e  would most  " d e s e r v e "  t o  g e t  a n  e x t r a  s e a t  
i f  t h e r e  w e r e  one more s e a t  t o  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d ?  T h i s  n o t i o n  
a p p l i e s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  house  monotone methods,  s i n c e  i n  g o i n g  
from any appor t ionment  f o r  h  t o  a n  appor t ionment  f o r  h  + 1  a  
house  monotone method g i v e s  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  s e a t  t o  e x a c t l y  one  
s t a t e  and a l l  o t h e r  a l l o c a t i o n s  remain  t h e  same. 
S u p p o s e , t h a t  f o r  some E - s o l u t i o n  f one s t a t e  ( h a v i n g  pop- 
u l a t i o n  s) ' h a s  s s e a t s  a t  h  w h i l e  a n o t h e r  s t a t e  ( h a v i n g  popu- 
l a t i o n  p*)  h a s  a *  s e a t s ,  and f a l l o c a t e s  t h e  ( h + l I s t  s e a t  t o  
t h e  $ s t a t e :  t h e n  t h e  b a r - s t a t e  i s  s a i d  t o  have weak p r i o r i t y  
- - - - 
o v e r  t h e  s t a r - s t a t e  a t  ( p , a ; p * , a * ) ,  w r i t t e n  ( p , a )  2 ( p * , a * ) .  
- - 
I f  i n  a n o t h e r  problem w e  a l s o  have  t h a t  (p*  , a * )  2 ( p , a )  , t h e n  
w e  s a y  t h e  b a r - s t a t e  and s t a r - s t a t e  a r e  t i e d ,  w r i t t e n  
- - ( p , a )  - ( p * , a * ) .  W e  s a y  t h a t  t h e  method E i s  c o n s i s t e n t  i f  i t  
t r e a t s  t i e d  s t a t e s  e q u a l l y  a s  r e g a r d s  r e c e i v i n g  one  more s e a t ;  
that is, there must be an alternate g-solution 2' which is an ex- 
h tension of f giving the (h+llSt seat to the star-state instead 
of the bar-state. 
The Jefferson method is consistent (see Lemma l(b)), as are 
the five Huntington or "modern" methods; in fact, it may be shown 
that the (generalized) "Huntington methods" are precisely the class 
of consistent, house-monotone methods[4]. However, the Hamilton 
method is not consistent as can be shown by example (see [ Z ] ) .  
While the Hamilton method fails to satisfy two basic proper- 
ties of apportionment methods, it does have the distinct virtue 
that its apportionment solutions are "close" to the exact quotas- 
-indeed the Hamilton method may be said to have been motivated by 
this desire. If qi is the exact quota of state i, let lqil be the 
largest integer less than or equal to qi and lq.1 the smallest 
1 
integer bigger than or equal to qi. Then g is said to s a t i s f y  
Lower quota  if for any g-apportionment a, a iqi], and M s a t i s -  i - 
f i e s  upper quota  if ai 2 Iqil. 
A method 8 is said to be the un ique  method satisfying cer- 
tain properties if any other method g' having these properties 
is a set of g-solutions, i.e. g' 5 N M. 
Theorem I .  The J e f f e r s o n  method i s  t h e  unique  method t h a t  
i s  house monotone, c o n s i s t e n t ,  and s a t i s f i e s  Lower q u o t a .  
First we need the following Lemma. 
Lemma I .  (a) Given p and h, 2 = (al , . . ,as) is a Jefferson 
N 
apportionment for h if and only if 
max 
i 
min 
i 
(b) The set of Jefferson solutions is the set of all solu- 
tions obtained recursively as follows: 
(ii) if a = fi(p,h) is an apportionment for h and k is some i - 
one state for which pk/(a +1) = ma:i pi/(ai+l) then k i 
fk(p,h+l) - = a  + 1 , k f = (pi,h+l) = a  for i # k . i i 
P r o o f .  By definition, is a Jefferson 
ment for h if and only ,if X ai = h and for some h 
Now (1 ) holds if and only if 
a + 1 2 pi/A 2 a i - - i 
equivalently, 
pi/(ai+l) 5 - h 5 - pi/ai for all i , 
(where if a = 0, pi/ai = +a), equivalently, i 
( 2 )  max pi/(ai+l) 5 - min p./ai , 
1 
proving (a). 
apportion- 
Given p ,  f ( p , O )  = 0  s a t i s f i e s  ( 2 ) .  Suppose w e  have shown 
N N N  
thak  any s o l u t i o n  up th rough  h  o b t a i n e d  v i a  ( b )  s a t i s f i e s  ( 2 ) .  
Then c l e a r l y  g i v i n g  one more s e a t  t o  some s t a t e  k maximizing 
p i / ( a i + l )  r e s u l t s  i n  an  appor t ionment  a l s o  s a t i s f y i n g  ( 2 ) .  Thus 
a l l  s o l u t i o n s  o b t a i n e d  v i a  ( b )  s a t i s f y  i n e q u a l i t y  ( 2 )  and a r e  
house monotone, hence t h e y  a r e  a l l  J e f f e r s o n  s o l u t i o n s .  Con- 
v e r s e l y ,  suppose f  i s  a  J e f f e r s o n  method s o l u t i o n  t h a t  i s  n o t  
N  
o b t a i n e d  v i a  ( b ) .  Then t h e r e  i s  a  s o l u t i o n  g  o b t a i n e d  v i a  ( b )  
N 
h  
and an  h  such t h a t  , . 4  gh = N f b u t  f o r  some p, g ( p , h + l )  f f ( p , h + l ) .  
N  N N  N  
I f  ( a l ,  ..., a  ) i s  t h e  common a l l o c a t i o n  a t  h ,  must t h e r e f o r e  
S 
s t  
accord  t h e  ( h + l )  s e a t  t o  some s t a t e  R such t h a t  p E / ( a E + l )  < 
max pi/ ( a .  +1) = p  / (ak+l  ) , b u t  t h e n  t h e  new a l l o c a t i o n  does  n o t  
i 1 k 
s a t i s f y  ( 2 ) ,  a   contradiction.^ 
For t h e  proof  o f  Theorem 1  w e  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  fo l l owing  
t e c h n i c a l  n o t i o n .  W e  say  t h a t  a  method i s  b a l a n c e d  i f  when- 
e v e r  two s t a t e s  have t h e  same p o p u l a t i o n  t h e n  t h e i r  appor t ionments  
cannot  d i f f e r  by more t han  o n e .  
Proo f  o f  Theorem I .  
The J e f f e r s o n  method is  house monotone--indeed it i s  g iven  
by t h e  s e t  o f  s o l u t i o n s  d e f i n e d  by Lemma l ( b ) .  Moreover, t h i s  
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  shows a t  once t h a t  it i s  c o n s i s t e n t .  To see 
t h a t  J s a t i s f i e s  lower quo t a ,  suppose n o t .  Then f o r  some appor-  
t ionment  2 f o r  h  w e  have a  < [ q i ] ,  t h a t  i s ,  a i  5 qi - 1. Then i 
f o r  some s t a t e  j f i w e  must have a  > q j .  L e t t i n g  h = L p  /h j k k  
w e  have t h e n  t h a t  q i  = pi/h, q j  = p . / h  and 
3 
contradicting Lemma 1 (a). 
Conversely, suppose that g is consistent house-monotone and 
satisfies lower quota, but is not a set of Jefferson solutions. 
Then by Lemma l(b) there exist populations p, q having g-allo- 
cations a, b which are also Jefferson allocations, but 
( 3 )  (p,a) L~ (q,b) whereas p/(a+l) < q/(b+l) . 
Consistency implies there exists an g-solution for the 2-state 
problem (p,q) allocating (a,b) seats respectively at h = a + b. 
This solution up to h = a + b may be represented 
From this we shall derive a contradiction. 
Notice first, that since is consistent, house-monotone 
Populations 
P 
and satisfies lower quota, is balanced. For otherwise there 
Solution up to a + b 
a = O  . .  a ' . a  1 
exists (by house monotonicity) an example in which two states have 
the same population p and apportionments a - 1 and a + 1. Hence 
by consistency there is an M-solution for the 2-state problem (p,p) 
N 
which allocates a - 1 and a + 1 seats respectively at h = 2a but 
then the a - 1 allocation does not satisfy lower quota. In par- 
ticular this shows (p, a-1 ) > (p, a) . 
"M 
Now consider a problem with population vector pt = (p, 
...,p,q) having t + 1 states, where t, an integer, satisfies 
t - > q/{q(a+l)-p(b+l)). Then, we affirm, )J has an apportionment 
(atat ..., a,b) for h = ta + b. Indeed we claim that for each 
h' - 5 ta + b the apportionment (a'-I, ...,a'-l,a',...~a'tb')~ where 
h' = tan - t' + b', constitutes an g-solution up to h having the 
property that the allocations to each of the pairs of states 
t + 1 )  (l<i<t) - - appears in (4)--that is, "agrees" with the solu- 
tion of (4). If ht = 0 this is obvious. If h' > 0 and t' = 0 
then by induction (a1,b') appears in' (4), so either (al,b') = (a,b) 
and we are done, or one of (al+l,b'), (a1,b'+l) is in ( 4 )  and we 
can go on. If t' > 0 then by induction (4) has an allocation 
(a'-l,bl) as well as (a1,b'), so (p,al-1) 2 (q,bl). But also 
(plat-1) 2 (ptal), and therefore we can obtain an E-apportionment 
for h' + 1 seats agreeing with (4). Thus, an ;-apportionment 
( a .  a )  is found for h = ta + b. Since by hypothesis (p,a) > 
"M 
(q,b), (a+l), ..., a+l,b) is an g-apportionment for h* = t(a+l) + b. 
But by the choice of t, the exact quota of state t + 1 at h = h* 
satisfies 
qh* - q(t(a+l)+b) , qb + q + tp(b+l) = b + 1 , 
- 
tp + q t p + q  = tP + q 
contradicting the fact that satisfies lower quota. This com- 
pletes the proof. 
The method of smallest divisors (LD) is defined to be the 
set of all house-monotone solutions that yield smallest divisors 
apportionments. That this set is non-empty follows from remarks 
sivtilar to those attendent to the monotonicity of Jefferson's 
method. S D  - has a symmetric relationship to 2 and similar tech- 
niques result in mirrored results. 
Theorem 2 .  The method o f  s m a l l e s t  d i v i s o r s  i s  t h e  u n i q u e  
method t h a t  i s  house-monotone, c o n s i s t e n t  and s a t i s f i e s  upper  
q u o t a .  
Again, we need a lemma which is easily established by argu- 
ments similar to those used for Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2 .  (a) Given p and h, 2 = (alf.. ,a ) is a smallest 
N S 
divisors apportionment for h if and only if 
(b) The set of smallest divisors solutions is the set of 
all solutions obtained recursively as follows: 
(ii) if ai = fi(p,h) is an apportionment for h and k is 
N 
some one state for which pk/ak = max pi/ait then 
i 
fk(p,h+l) N = ak + 1 , fi(pth+l) - = ai for i # k . 
The proof of Theorem 2 parallels that of Theorem 1. 
S-D is clearly consistent and house-monotone by Lemma 2. 
To see it satisfies upper quota, suppose not. Then for some 
apportionment LJ for h we have ai > [qil, that is ai 2 qi + 1. 
Then f o r  some s t a t e  j # i w e  must have a  < q,. L e t t i n g  j 
h = Zk pk/h w e  have t h e n  t h a t  qi = pi/h, q j  = p . / h  and 
3 
p j / a j  > 2 - pi / (a i -1)  
c o n t r a d i c t i n g  Lemma 2 ( a ) .  
Converse ly ,  suppose  t h a t  g, c o n s i s t e n t ,  house-monotone and 
s a t i s f y i n g  upper q u o t a ,  i s  n o t  LD. Then t h e r e  e x i s t  p o p u l a t i o n s  
( p , q )  hav ing  a l l o c a t i o n s  a ,  b  which a r e  SJ a l l o c a t i o n s  b u t  
( p f a )  2 ( q , b )  whereas  p /a  < q/b . 
From t h i s  w e  d e r i v e  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  
By arguments i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  used i n  p rov ing  Theorem 1 ,  
pJ h a s  an  appor t ionment  ( a , b , b ,  ..., b )  f o r  h  = a  + t b ,  f o r  a  
problem w i t h  t + 1  s t a t e s  and p o p u l a t i o n s  ( p , q ,  . . . , q  ) ,  where 
t ,  i n t e g e r ,  s a t i s f i e s  t 2 p/{aq-bp}. By c o n s i s t e n c y  ( a + l , b ,  ..., b )  
- 
i s  an  bJ-apportionment f o r  h  = h* = a  + t b  + 1 .  But ,  by t h e  
c h o i c e  of t ,  t h e  e x a c t  quo t a  o f  t h e  f i r s t  s t a t e  a t  h  = h* s a t i s f i e s  
ph* = p ( a + t b + l )  < pa + t q a  = a 
P  + t q  p + t b  = p + t q  
c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  upper  quo t a .  T h i s  com- 
p l e t e s  t h e  p r o o f .  
4. Satisfying Quota 
A method is said to satisfy quota if it satisfies both lower 
quota and upper quota. It turns out that no monotone and con- 
sistent method satisfies quota [2], whence, in particular, 2 
does not satisfy upper quota and SJD does not satisfy lower quota. 
Of course, the Hamilton method does satisfy quota; however it is 
neither consistent nor monotone. 
Proportionality, or "according to respective numbers," means 
ideally, attributing to each state its exact quota. But rational 
allocations are not permitted, integers are required. Historical 
precedent, beginning with the deliberations at the Constitutional 
Convention, establishes the need for satisfying quota. Further, 
any apportionment not satisfying quota has been [91, and would be, 
found by the ordinary citizen to be contrary to common sense. 
Second, ever since the recognition of the Alabama paradox, house 
monotonicity has, by Congress, been taken as an essential property. 
Therefore, it is natural to ask if there does exist a method which 
satisfies quota and is house-monotone. The answer is yes. If 
consistency is weakened to apply only when quota is not violated, 
then there is a method, called the quota method, which is the 
unique method satisfying these properties [1,3]. Thus, Hamilton's 
principle of satisfying quota is reconciled with Jefferson's 
approach. 
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